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Abstratct 
China, the most populated country in the world, has blocked all the global social media 
services, and this attracted many scholars to study what are happening in China. I use Sina 
Weibo, the Chinese version of Twitter, to study the political power of social media in this 
country and conclude that mobile social media do empower the Chinese citizens and make 
the Chinese society more transparent. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Siri: “What can I do for you?” Penny: “Find me the best Chinese food restaurant near 
Campus Drive.” Siri: “I don’t like the word ‘best’; it’s superficial. I suggest you some 
popular restaurants…” Jim: “Siri sucks try Yelp, buddy.” … Ten minutes later, we go to the 
Shanghai café. Half an hour passed, and food is served. “Hey, looks great!” “Wait a minute, 
let me take a picture.” “Me too!” Everybody takes out iPhone; shoot; upload it on Facebook. 
What? An airplane missed! Then all check Twitter. No one knows what is happening. OK, let 
us try New York Times; they should do the journalist job. Everyone is looking at the mobile. 
“Could we have human being interactions or just eat?” Welcome to the messy world of social 
media. Today, nearly everyone uses social media, talks social media, no matter what one’s 
favorite platform is, and we are overwhelmed by social media.  
However, social media does not always works so smoothly. In the Occupy Wall Street 
Movement, the Tunisian Revolution, or the Egyptian one, social media services revealed their 
political power and raised a question that whether social media could empower the ordinary 
people. Without Twitter, Facebook, or YouTube, would these still happen? What is the 
situation in the countries without access to the global social media platforms? Syria, China, 
and Iran have banned the access to Facebook (“Censorship of Facebook”, 2014). North 
Korean, China, Iran and Turkey have blocked Twitter (“Censorship of Twitter”, 2014). 
China, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkmenistan have banned YouTube (“Censorship of YouTube”, 
2014). China, the most populated country in the world has no access to almost all global 
social media services. 
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Thus, many scholars have studied this special situation in China. Until now most are 
focusing on user behaviors, Internet censorship, crisis management, corruption, and foreign 
affairs. Less attention is paid to how the Chinese citizens use Sina Weibo in political issues 
and the political power of Sina Weibo. For the Chinese domestic scholars, it is hard to study a 
political sensitive project because of the pressure from the Chinese government; for the 
international researchers, it is very difficult to study such topics if they cannot read Chinese 
language since the information on Sina Weibo is all in Chinese.  
This gap between the political power of social media and the lack of relevant studies 
urges me to research the political influence of social media. Although little is known about 
how the Chinese social media works in political issues, the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences claimed that the public could make the government know their opinions via Internet, 
and Internet become the channels by which the government and the regular people 
communicate. They even predicted that “the Internet will become a stronger influence on 
politics in China as the number of users continues to grow (Scotton, 2010, p. 41, New media, 
new China). These claims imply that social media constitutes a new public sphere of political 
communication where public opinions might form in China and even influence the Chinese 
government on political issues. 
This paper seeks to test whether Sina Weibo constitutes a public sphere in China, to 
examine whether social media empower or control the Chinese people, and to explore the 
future of social media as a political power and the future they bring the country to.  
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Chapter 2: Background 
Social Media Definition 
The meaning of “social media” in the digital world is always debatable. Ahlqvist, 
Back, Halonen and Heinonen (2008, p. 3) proposed that social mediacontains three elements: 
“content, user communities and Web 2.0 technologies”. Kaplan and Haenlein (2010, p. 61) 
defined social media as “a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological 
and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of User 
Generated Content”. Bruns and Bahnisch suggested that social media is “networked 
information services designed to support in-depth social interaction, community formation, 
collaborative opportunities and collaborative work” (as cited in Hunsinger & Senft, 2009, p. 
1). In this article, Social Media is defined as network-based services accessible to the general 
public armed with mobile and web-based technologies to support users to create, share, 
exchange, modify, and discuss User-generated content (UGC), to interact with individuals, 
communities, and organizations, to form communities, and to act collectively.  
History & Influence 
Before the turn of the new millennium, new media services helped to form online 
groups, but could not connect users automatically (Dijck, 2013); just shortly after the 
millennium social media became as what we know it today. Blogger (1999), Wikipedia 
(2001), Facebook (2003), LinkedIn (2003), Flick (2004), YouTube (2005), Twitter (2006), 
Instagram (2010), and etc. have brought us to the social media era, and change the way we 
used to live. Chatting with friends, showing pictures, or watching family members and 
neighbors’ videos used to be casual activities and shared within a small group; the social 
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media platforms take these private behaviors to the wider publics, and the original owner can 
no longer control the flow of the information. In contrast, news broadcasting, political 
campaigning, or business marketing used to reach audience via mass media; with social 
media, these public activities go to the individual level. The boundaries between public and 
private blurred, the nature of public and private communication changed, and the lives of 
online and offline mixed.  
Not only in America, but also in the world, the changes brought by social media are 
huge. Many governments have an uneasy life with social media, and some people believe that 
social media will bring democracy to the oppressed countries. For instance, in Arab Spring 
nine out of ten Egyptians and Tunisians reported that they used Facebook to organize action 
(Huang, 2011). Lotan et al. (2011, p. 1401) even argued that “the revolutions were, indeed, 
tweeted”. Although it is debatable whether Twitter played an important role in the 
revolutions, it did raise global awareness of the events.  
Then, what if we cannot know? We can hear the voices of the people who have 
equipped with global social media services, but how about the people have not? The digital 
divide mute the have not, and others might ignore their existences. Because of such 
restrictions, it is nearly impossible to truly understand the situation in these countries without 
living at there. Someone might ask: what is happening in these countries? 
Social Media in China 
It has been an open secret that the Chinese government has implemented censorship 
to mass media and Internet. Freedom House (2013) ranked China 179 in all 196 countries as 
one of the least press free country in the world. Reporters Without Borders (2014) also listed 
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China as one of the Internet enemies and claimed that the Chinese government applies 
censorship to maintain social stability. Google, Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and 
Wordpressan all have been blocked in China, and even the international services survived 
have been strictly censored. Although many global social media services are forbidden in 
China, their Chinese equivalents have been flourishing. As shows in Figure 1, every 
American social media platform has its Chinese version developed by the domestic 
companies with some minor differences. Thus, the Chinese residents do not miss the social 
media era, and the Chinese Internet users are some of the most intensive social media users in 
the world (Crampton, p. 29). The separated migrant workers’ families, the lonely one-child 
generation, and the unreliable state-run mass media all have contribute to the popular of 
social media in China (Crampton, p. 29).   
 
Figure 1. Social Media Equivalents in China. From “Social Media in China: The Same, but 
Bi 9 
 
Different Participating in China's unique and diverse social media environment is key to 
winning over online consumers,” by T. Crampton, 2011, China Business Review, 38(1), 28. 
The Chinese social media services have been supplanting the traditional media, and 
even might challenge the Chinese government. A survey conducted by Fudan University 
reported that “more than 70 percent of people believe that new media can be more powerful 
tools for democratic supervision than traditional media” (“New Media”, n.d., para. 1).  
Mircoblogging and Sina Weibo 
Microblogging is an online broadcast medium that allows users to send short 
messages (usually within 140 characters) to update their daily activities, report the latest 
news, or express opinions. Within all the Chinese social media services, the most popular is 
Sina Weibo, a microblogging services like Twitter. On Sina Weibo, the Chinese Internet 
users can send messages, post photos, upload audios or videos, and comment on other’s 
posts. Also, microbloggers can follow anyone on Weibo freely. Because of these 
conveniences, the user number of Sina Weibo has grown explosively since 2009 when it was 
launched after the Urumqi riots when all the previous domestic Weibo services were shut 
down and all international microblogging services were blocked. According to China Internet 
Network Information Center (the state-run internet management institution), the number of 
microbloggers reached 249 million in 2011 that accounted for nearly half of the number of 
Internet users in China. Also, it increased by 296 percent compared to 2010 and was the 
fastest growing Internet service in 2011 (China Internet Development Statistics Report 29). 
In addition to the huge number of users of Weibo, microblogging in China has 
another unique feature: one in every two posts in Sina Weibo is updated through mobile 
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phone, whereas only 20 percent of Twitter texts are sent via cell phone (Crampton 30). This 
seems nothing special at first glance. However, the widely use of mobile on Sina Weibo 
reveals the essence of Weibo: “individual, instant, and interactive” (Hu 68). In contemporary 
society, mobile phones are considered to be one of the goods people must carry every day. 
Without it, one would feel uncomfortable or even anxious. Hence, the combination of mobile 
phone and microblogging in China turns Sina Weibo into a powerful tool. Any time, any 
place, any person can take a picture, write a commentary, and post it on Weibo via mobile 
phone. This is an efficient way to publish breaking news, express opinions, and communicate 
with other netizens. From this perspective, Sina Weibo is not only a social media platform, 
but also a mobile media service. Mobile social media is a new concept in the social media 
area. Wikipedia explains it as “the combination of mobile devices and social media”. 
Typically, the mobile devices related to social media are mobile phone and tablets, and in 
nowadays mobile devices usually include big screen, camera, Wi-Fi service, and Bluetooth. 
With the help of these technologies, mobile social media works more efficient than the 
traditional social media, and even have a function that the traditional social media does not 
have: location-sensitivity.  
Before the launch of Weibo, the ordinary Chinese people could not spread 
information and communicate with each other so efficiently. Guomin Yu, a journalism 
professor in Renmin University of China states that during 2011 Weibo has become the most 
important channels of the Chinese netizens to access information online. Since the 
implementation of information control and censorship in mass media by the Chinese 
government, Chinese citizens sometimes are difficult to obtain “sensitive” information via 
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state-run TV programs or newspapers, no matter what kind of mainstream media, especially 
about the scandals of the Chinese government, man-made disasters, or protests against the 
Chinese government. Nonetheless, sometimes such controversial issues spread all over China 
since the eyewitnesses update them on Sina Weibo immediately, and millions of 
microbloggers might see it. Even though the Chinese government tried to delete these 
messages, they cannot control the information broadcasting since tens of thousands of the 
same messages were re-posted per hour on Sina Weibo and other famous websites such as 
Tianya and Mop. Also, the Chinese government always notices the events after they have 
already caused widespread concern. Therefore, many people consider Sina Weibo a more 
powerful tool compared to other online social media services such as blogs to impact or even 
change the Chinese society.  
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Chapter 3: Literature Review: 
Concepts Related to the Political Power of Social Media 
Public Sphere 
The public sphere is a public space where individuals or groups could joint together to 
freely discuss social problems and public interests, to form public opinions, and even to 
influence political actions via the talk. The concept of public sphere is strongly connected to 
Jurgen Habermas’s book: The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere – An inquiry 
into a Category of Bourgeois Society. According to Habermas, the important conditions of 
the public sphere are:   
• Formation of public opinion. 
• All citizens have access. 
• Conference in unrestricted fashion (freedom of assembly, freedom of    
association, freedom to expression and publications of opinions) about matters of 
general interest. 
• Debate over the general rules governing relations. (as cited in Fuchs, 2013, p. 181) 
Futher, when discussing the Internet and the public sphere, many scholars asserted 
that the aspects of political communication and political economy are related to the concept 
of the public sphere, and Habermas also confirmed that these aspects are “constitutive for the 
public sphere” (Fuchs, 2013, p. 183). Thus, Fuchs proposed that to test whether an Internet 
platform form a new public sphere, one should examine both the political communication and 
the political economy level: 
1)  Analysis of the political economic dimension of mediated communication: 
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1(a) Ownership: 
    Is there a democratic ownership of the media organization and resources? 
1(b) Censorship: 
    Is there political and/ or economic censorship? 
1(c) Exclusion: 
    Is there an overrepresentation of viewpoints of corporate elites or of uncritical  
    and pro-capitalist viewpoints? To which degree are critical viewpoints present? 
1(d) Political content production: 
    Who can produce content? How visible, relevant and influential is the produced 
    content? 
2) Analysis of political communication: 
2(a) Universal access: 
    How relevant/ frequently used are political communication sites or political  
    communication forums/ features/ contents within more general platforms? Who 
    has access and who use the sites for political communication (income, education   
    level, age, gender, ethnicity, origin, etc.)? How relevant is political       
          communication in relation to other forms of communication (for example, as 
          pure entertainment)?  
      2(b) Independence: 
          How independent are the sites and discussions from economic and state  
          interests? 
      2(c) Quality of political discussion: 
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           How valid (right, true, truthful, understandable), inclusive, attentive, sincere,  
           reflexive and inclusive is political online discussion? (p. 184-185) 
Habermas’s idea of public sphere is an idea concept, and this concept was challenged by the 
working-class critique and the Feminist critique. Fuchs provided a more practical method to 
test the existence of public sphere in Internet. Thus my research is base on Fuchs’s proposal. 
Debates Over The Political Role of Social Media 
When discussing the political influence of social media, on the one hand optimistic 
scholars claim that social media spread democratic ideas and help to free the people (e.g., 
Twitter revolution), and on the other hand pessimistic researchers believe that social media 
has little effect on real-life activism and are monitoring tools by states, and commerce 
instruments for companies, or even cause of violence (e.g., Internet surveillance and 
marketing).  
Pessimistic Views of Social Media  
Gladwell (2010) claimed that real-life activism is different from online activism; 
offline protesters usually take huge risks such as in the Mississippi Freedom Project of 1964. 
He also stated that a strong social tie is crucial in high-risk activism, e.g., friends, roommates, 
or family members, but on social media platforms people are connected by weak social ties in 
online activism. Although social media is good for people to get information, they seldom 
join high-risk activism if connected by weak ties. Gladwell also suggested that the lack of 
hierarchy and authority existed in offline activism makes social media works well in low-risk 
conditions such as Wikipedia, but not in complicated situations when people need to think 
strategically. Similar to Gladwell, Morozov used “slacktivism”, “feel-good online activism 
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that has zero political or social impact”, to describe the typical activism of “lazy generation”: 
“why bother with sit-ins and the risk of arrest, police brutality, or torture if one can be as loud 
campaigning in the virtual space”. He argued that public attention generated by social media 
does not have effectiveness for real campaigns. (2009)  
Even worse, some scholars believe that social media even harm civil society. Iosifidis 
argued that the political power of Internet and social media is overstated for several reasons:  
the open participation of the Internet can turn chaotic; there is a problem of 
inclusiveness; censorship might be an issue; the Internet has become a major arena for 
corporate activity; the Internet’s content is highly partisan; and above all, extensive 
dialogure and critical discussion (the very essence of the public sphere) is often absent 
on the Net. (619)  
He also proposed that open-platform Public Service Media (PSM) is the future of a true 
public sphere.  
Optimistic Views  
Shirky (2011) argued that:  
The safest characterization of recent quantitative attempts to answer the question, Do 
digital tools enhance democracy? (such as those by Jacob Groshek and Philip 
Howard) is that these tools probably do not hurt in the short run and might help in the 
long run -- and that they have the most dramatic effects in states where a public 
sphere already constrains the actions of the government.  
She also claimed that the effect of social media in political activism is coordination, and the 
commerce does not hurt the political effects. Moreover she proposed that general social 
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media platforms would be more useful than specific political media tools to pursue civil 
society and strengthen public spheres because “the conservative dilemma”:  
The dilemma is created by new media that increase public access to speech or 
assembly; with the spread of such media, whether photocopiers or Web browsers, a 
state accustomed to having a monopoly on public speech finds itself called to account 
for anomalies between its view of events and the public's. The two responses to the 
conservative dilemma are censorship and propaganda. But neither of these is as 
effective a source of control as the enforced silence of the citizens. The state will 
censor critics or produce propaganda as it needs to, but both of those actions have 
higher costs than simply not having any critics to silence or reply to in the first place. 
But if a government were to shut down Internet access or ban cell phones, it would 
risk radicalizing otherwise pro-regime citizens or harming the economy. 
Similar to Shirky’s opinion, many Chinese scholars believe that social media has been 
contributing to the formation of a new Chinese civil society. Dong (2013) suggested that 
Weibo, as a public sphere, would lead the Chinese to a democratic society though it has some 
limitations. 
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Chapter 4: Research Design 
The basic idea of this research is applying quantitative methods to a qualitative study: 
combining content analysis and case study, to test whether Sina Weibo constitutes a public 
sphere in China, and to explore how the regular Chinese people use it in political issue. Based 
on Fuchs’s opinion that the aspects of political communication and political economy are 
crucial to examine whether an Internet platform constitutes a public sphere, I propose three 
steps to test social media: 
1. Analysis of independence of Chinese social media:  
i) Ownership:  
Who owns Sina Weibo? Is the ownership democratic? 
ii) Censorship: 
Do censorship exist on Sina Weibo? What is the mechanism of the censorship? 
What are the reasons of implementing censorship? 
iii)  Interest groups: 
Is there any manipulation of Sina Weibo information from political or economical 
interests? 
2. The availability of social media:  
iv) Accessibility: 
Who has access to Sina Weibo? Is there any technical obstacle? 
v) User structure 
Who uses Sina Weibo? Who can produce political content? Is there any 
overrepresented group or underrepresented group? 
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3. The political role of social media:  
vi) Political content: 
How visible and influential is political contents?  
vii)  Political discussion 
How valid is political discussion? Is there critical opinion exist? What is the 
influence of political discussion? 
In the third step, the method of content analysis was applied to examine the quality of 
political discussion on Sina Weibo and explore whether public opinion was formed 
(Appendix). 
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Chapter 5: Data Analysis and Discussions 
Independence 
Ownership 
Sina Weibo is a Chinese social media platform launched by Sina Corporation on 
August 14, 2009. Although the number of Sina Weibo users has been increasing fast, Sina 
Weibo has not found its profit model. On 2012, Sina Weibo’s revenue was 66 million dollars, 
but it spent more than 160 million dollars to operate. Thus it still lost 94 million dollars 
(“Sina Weibo, 2013). According to the same report, value-added services such as mircogame 
accounted for 23 percent of revenue, and advertising accounted for 77 percent. Until now, 
Sina Weibo has not applied the same strategy of Twitter-“promoted tweets, promoted trends, 
promoted accounts” (Fuchs, 2013, p. 198)-which gives preferences to advertising clients. 
From this perspective, Sina Weibo does not treat economically powerful users and ordinary 
netizens differently. However, Sina Weibo has been actively seeking profit model and it is 
highly possible they will apply promoting strategies in the future.  
Censorship 
The Chinese censorship on Internet has ben extensively studied in American 
academic area. In most recent researches, King, Pan, and Roberts (2013) did a large scale 
experimental study on Chinese social media and found that “the censorship program is aimed 
at curtailing collective action by silencing comments that represent, reinforce, or spur social 
mobilization, regardless of content” (p. 326). They also believed that the issues about the 
corruptions of high-level Chinese offices and online protests are tolerated to publish on social 
media, and the Chinese government is still using human source to apply censorship though 
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automated review exist (King, Pan & Roberts, 2014). All their statements match the Chinese 
common sense of how the Chinese government applies censorship on Sina Weibo. 
Interest Groups 
In China the Internet Water Army (网络水军) is a group of paid posters hired by 
public relations companies or the Chinese government to manipulate or change the public 
opinion. Yang (2011) separated Water Army into three groups: Free Navy, 50 Cent Party, 
and Internet marketer. Free Navy, which should not be considered a group, means netizens 
spontaneously forward or comment on a topic; 50 Cent Party is a group of Internet writers 
work for the Chinese government and try to manipulate the public opinion on certain issues 
and spread political propaganda; Internet marketer usually are paid posters from PR 
companies to popularize movies or products. Although Water Army is active on Internet, Li 
and Zheng (2012) argued that it “has only limited impact on online public opinion 
communication” (p. 30). Especially in political discussion, if someone posts pro-government 
opinion, she or he will be blamed as 50 Cent. Therefore, it is difficult for the Chinese 
government to manipulate public opinion. 
Availability 
Accessibility 
As shows in Figure 2 and Figure 3, the Internet penetration rate has reached 45.8 
percent till 2013 in China, but there is a huge gap between urban and rural China. Also, Table 
1 shows that the Internet penetration rates in different provinces are disproportionate. In 
Beijing and Shanghai, the Meta cities, more than 70 percent of the population can use 
Internet. However, in the last three provinces the Internet penetration rate are all less than one 
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third. This phenomenon implies that many people from less accessible regions are 
underrepresented, and some specific groups might control the online opinions.   
 
Figure 2. The number of Internet users and the Internet penetration in China. Adapted 
from “Statictical Report on Internet Development in China,” by China Internet Network 
Information Center, 2014. 
 
Figure 3. The Internet penetration of urban and rural China. Adapted from “Statictical 
Report on Internet Development in China,” by China Internet Network Information 
Center, 2014. 
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Table 1  
The Internet penetrations and of all regions in China in 2013 & The proportion of Sina 
Weibo users related to political topics from different provinces (PWP) 
Province Internet 
Users 
(10,000) in 
2013 
Internet 
Penetration 
and Rank in 
2013 
PWP and 
Rank in 
PWP in 
2014 
 
GDP per 
capital 
(US$) and 
Rank in 
2012 
Urbanization 
Rate and 
Rank in 
2011 
Beijing 1556 75.2% (1) 8.74% (2) 13,797 (2) 79.36% (2) 
Shanghai 1683 70.7% (2) 4.27% (5) 13,471 (3) 89.32% (1) 
Guangdong 6992 66.0% (3) 11.52% (1) 8,570 (8) 52.17% (5) 
Fujian 2402 64.1% (4) 2.71% (10) 8,359 (9) 34.01% (17) 
Tianjin 866 61.3% (5) 1.67% (20) 14,750 (1) 61.50% (3) 
Zhejiang 3330 60.8% (6) 4.43% (4) 10,022 (6) 31.41% (21) 
Liaoning 2453 55.9% (7) 2.5% (12) 8,958 (7) 51.16% (6) 
Jiangsu 4095 51.7% (8) 4.45% (3) 10,827 (4) 54.09% (4) 
Xinjiang 1094 49.0% (9) 1.24% (28) 5,372 (18) 42.84% (9) 
Shanxi (山西) 1755 48.6% (10) 1.65% (21) 5,327 (19) 33.22% (19) 
Qinghai 274 47.8% (11) 0.78% (32) 5,231 (21) 33.43% (18) 
Hebei 3389 46.5% (12) 2.64% (11) 5,796 (15) 31.91% (20) 
Hainan 411 46.4% (13) 1.14% (29) 5,129 (22) 38.13% (14) 
Shaanxi (陕西
) 
1689 45.0% (14) 1.96% (15) 6,108 (14) 35.58% (15) 
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Shandong 4329 44.7% (15) 3.79% (6) 8,201 (10) 41.13% (10) 
Chongqing 1293 43.9% (16) 1.84% (17) 6,191 (12) 38.37% (13) 
Inner 
Mongolia 
1093 43.9% (17) 1.3% (26) 10,189 (5) 40.80% (11) 
Ningxia 283 43.7% (18) 0.86% (31) 5,729 (16) 38.86% (12) 
Hubei 2491 43.1% (19) 2.79% (9) 6,111 (13) 34.52% (16) 
Jilin 1163 42.3% (20) 1.47% (24) 6,877 (11) 47.67% (8) 
Heilongjiang 1514 39.5% (21) 1.81% (18) 5,657 (17) 48.48% (7) 
Guangxi 1774 37.9% (22) 1.92% (16) 4,427 (27) 19.23% (28) 
Xizang 
(Tibet) 
115 37.4% (23) 0.73% (34) 3,633 (28) 17.35% (29) 
Hunan 2410 36.3% (24) 2.4% (13) 5,304 (20) 22.33% (26) 
Anhui 2150 35.9% (25) 2.26% (14) 4,561 (26) 22.90% (25) 
Sichuan 2835 35.1% (26) 3.38% (7) 4,686 (24) 27.19% (22) 
Henan 3283 34.9% (27) 3.19% (8) 5,025 (23) 22.08% (27) 
Gansu 894 34.7% (28) 1.26% (27) 3,482 (30) 26.19% (24) 
Guizhou 1146 32.9% (29) 1.32% (25) 3,100 (31) 16.21% (31) 
Yunnan 1528 32.8% (30)  1.57% (22) 3,516 (29) 16.58% (30) 
Jiangxi 1468 32.6% (31) 1.69% (19) 4,562 (25) 26.78% (23) 
Hong Kong N/A N/A 1.52% (23) N/A N/A 
Macao N/A N/A 0.74% (33) N/A N/A 
Taiwan N/A N/A 1.06% (30) N/A N/A 
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Data Source. Statictical Report on Internet Development in China From, 
http://data.weibo.com/index/industry, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Chinese_administrative_divisions_by_GDP_per_capita, 
and http://www.docin.com/p-696557638.html 
User Structure 
As Figure 4, 5, and 6 show, the typical Sina Weibo user was, less than 34 years old, 
had a bachelor degree, female or male. Similar to the Internet penetration rates in different 
provinces, the distribution of Sina Weibo users is also proportionated as shows in Figure 7. 
The young, well-educated urban residents dominate Sina Weibo, whereas old people, 
uneducated, and rural residents are underrepresented. In addition, Table 2 shows that 
messages from popular Sina Weibo account owners can reach far more audience than regular 
accounts, and the online opinion might be heavily influenced by these accounts.  
Figure 4. Age distribution on Sina Weibo & in China 
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Figure 5. Gender distribution on Sina Weibo & China 
 
Figure 6. Education level on Sina Weibo & China 
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Figure 7. The distribution of Sina Weibo users in China. Adapted from “The Official 
Reprot of Sina Weibo Users in 2012,” by the Sina Inc., 2012.   
 Table 2  
 The Comparison of Sina Weibo Accounts on Home Page 
 Zhong Rujiu (victim  
in Yihuang event) 
Deng Fei (journalist) Chen Kun (actor) 
Number Re-tweet Comment Re-tweet Comment Re-tweet Comment 
1 4 1 16 8 1,025 381 
2 7 1 10 5 1,825 2,094 
3 113 2 61 12 1,459 1,140 
4 5 1 93 22 1,166 630 
5 3 2 58 26 458 261 
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6 5 2 33 27 10,511 3,537 
7 8 2 100 18 7,017 2,563 
8 8 0 47 20 3,719 4,011 
9 13 1 43 14 1,250 1,311 
10 9 3 867 62 22,003 5,060 
11 11 4 782 83 30,595 1,921 
12 17 2 338 69 4,387 3,195 
13 17 0 450 67 7,784 2,815 
14 73 1 643 115 612 336 
15 10 4 444 85 3,096 858 
16 5 2 123 46 485 429 
17 5 1 531 124 1,913 593 
18 5 0 373 67 6,372 3,610 
19 2 1 135 9 1,260 1,990 
20 20 3 5 6 26,968 11,856 
21 45 2 203 31 2,639 1,931 
22 3 0 737 36 1,398 1,677 
23 3 1 34 21 633 699 
24 6 2 17 6 483 365 
25 7 2 12 4 841 726 
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26 11 2 25 9 5,289 894 
27 8 1 62 25 543 522 
28 141 2 20 7 15,408 3,704 
29 14 3 17 15 2,748 5,134 
30 0 0 24 9 837 385 
31 8 3 8 10 1,053 461 
32 2 0 44 37 450 332 
33 4 3 15 8 2,123 562 
34 16 8 35 14 328 336 
35 2 0 1149 219 1,906 1,132 
36 1 1 362 76 628 1,157 
37 17 2 165 168 5,825 1,079 
38 10 3 363 120 3,028 1,034 
39 67 5 236 96 986 751 
40 2 1 1035 299 5,464 1,703 
41 10 3 13 5 10,264 1,414 
42 8 2 101 22 4,177 988 
43 19 0 287 85 2,134 632 
44 3 2 89 17 768 424 
45 3 1 92 25 2,883 1,847 
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Average 16.7 1.8 228.8 50.0 4594.2 1744 
 
The Political Role of Sina Weibo 
Political Content 
In 2013, only three topics in all the twenty trending topics were political topics, and 
Sina Weibo was dominated by entertainment (Table 4). Also, as shows in Table 3, only one 
political actor was in the top 50 ranking ordered by follower number. Celebrities from 
dominated attentions on Sina Weibo, and politics is less important in contrast to 
entertainment, not to mention the regular people.  
Table 3  
The most popular accounts on Sina Weibo 
Rank, Followers, and Type (E=entertainment, C=culture, B=business, SW=Sina Weibo 
Official Accounts, P=politics, M=media, N=news, S=sports, F=funny) 
1. 
(72,01
8,670), 
E 
2. 
(63,89
8,961), 
E 
3. 
(61,70
9,540), 
C  
4. 
(58,14
7,134), 
E 
5. 
(55,65
0,371), 
E 
6. 
(55,53
5,327), 
E 
7. 
(51,39
6,340), 
B 
8. 
(50,02
5,632), 
E 
9. 
(49,20
5,581), 
SW  
10. 
(48,98
8,170), 
SW 
11. 
(45,96
3,099), 
E 
12. 
(45,27
3,264), 
E 
13. 
(44,13
9,848), 
E 
14. 
(44,03
8,059), 
SW 
15. 
(42,58
1,195), 
E 
16. 
(41,88
9,447), 
E 
17. 
(41,67
4,512), 
P 
18. 
(41,35
6,543), 
SW 
19. 
(40,88
9,315), 
E 
20. 
(40,19
8,479), 
E 
21. 
(39,86
4,291), 
E/B 
22. 
(39,39
7,177), 
E 
23. 
(37, 
047,45
9), E 
24. 
(36,75
2,302), 
E 
25. 
(35,49
6,485), 
E 
26. 
(35,28
9,883), 
E 
27. 
(35,25
5,603), 
E 
28. 
(34,71
4,127), 
M/B 
29. 
(34,53
5,745), 
E 
30. 
(34,21
7,985), 
E 
31. 
(34,02
0,446), 
32. 
(33,84
0,046), 
33. 
(33,67
8,514), 
34. 
(33,64
1,230), 
35. 
(32,58
3,343), 
36. 
(31,71
2,504), 
37. 
(31,36
1,544), 
38. 
(31,00
5,801), 
39. 
(30,93
6,361), 
40. 
(30,88
8,247), 
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C M/E E E E E SW/M
/N 
C/E/M M E 
41. 
(30,74
6,449), 
E 
42. 
(30,38
1,138), 
F 
43. 
(29,74
1,128), 
E 
44. 
(29,49
4,146), 
E 
45. 
(29,10
7,237), 
E 
46. 
(28,82
6,645), 
E 
47. 
(28,43
4,706), 
E 
48. 
(28,10
4,210), 
E 
49. 
(27,35
0,674), 
S 
50. 
(26,91
4,448), 
E 
Data Source: http://data.weibo.com/top/hot/all  
Table 4  
Top trend on Sina Weibo in 2013 (C=crisis, E=entertainment, EV=event, NB=network 
buzzwords (usually satire), P=politics) 
Rank Topic Brief 
Introduction 
Type 
 
The number 
of mention 
The number 
of searching 
1 We want to make 
friends with Tuhao 
“Tuhao” was 
used to be a 
negative word to 
describe 
landowner 
 
NB 
 
 
134,770,812 86,845 
2 11/11 on Tianmao A shopping 
festival 
EV 
 
127,721,535 79,358 
3 Yaan earthquake  C 97,696,760 327,227 
4 Diaosi A 
self-deprecating 
word means 
young poor guy 
NB 93,823,603 64,995 
5 The voice of China A reality talent 
show 
E 60,546,809 2,226,647 
6 Spring gala The traditional 
Chinese spring 
festival TV 
EV 41,668,208 407,031 
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program 
7 Tiny Times A movie E 40,457,979 1,704,253 
8 Xue Manzi was 
arrested for whoring 
behavior 
Xue Manzi is an 
opinion leader on 
Weibo 
P 29,975,104 1,165,179 
9 So Young A movie E 29,951,153 842,551 
10 Super Boy A singing contest E 18,310,889 1,166,116 
11 Dad, Where Are We 
Going 
A reality show E 197,729,982 3,299,340 
12 Haze Over China A environmental 
disaster 
 
C 
16,271,903 69,312 
13 The Defeat of the 
Chinese Soccer Team 
 EV 15,088,298 269,886 
14 I Am a Singer A singing 
competition 
program 
 
E 
 
14,662,598 2,133,097 
15 Avian Flu H7N9  C 14,184,368 264,436 
16 Two Sessions National 
People’s 
Congress and 
Chinese People’s 
Political 
Consultative 
Conferences 
 
P & 
EV 
 
 
 
 
9,480,529 128,675 
17 Chinese Idol Similar to 
American Idol 
E 
 
7,919,904 721,884 
18 The Big Yellow Duck A giant modern 
sculpture 
NB 
 
7,730,290 228,763 
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19 Li XX was alleged to 
be a suspect in a rape 
case 
Li XX (Tianyi) 
is a Chinese 
general’s son 
P 
 
 
7,371,065 1,581,080 
20 Shenzhou 10 A space mission EV 
 
6,055,569 31,448 
 Data Source: Sina Weibo Data Center 
Political Discussion 
For analyzing the quality of political discussion on Sina Weibo, I selected Yihuang 
event as the topic and examined the posts of Zhong Rujiu and Deng fei on the same incident. 
Table 5 shows that the followers of Deng fei (opinion leader) tended to forward the message, 
whereas the followers of Zhong Rujiu (the victim in Yihuang event) tended to comment. This 
implies that the opinion leaders on Sina Weibo work like media to spread information, while 
the original regular posters attract more users to engage in discussion. Hence, the discussion 
from Zhong’s account was chose to conduct content analysis. Based on this analysis 54.6 
percent of all comments are typical political comments, and in all the political comments 55 
percent people held negative views on the Chinese government in this event. No user held a 
positive view on the government. In this case, at least a group opinion was formed on Sina 
Weibo if it could not be defined as public opinion. In order to study whether Sina Weibo 
influenced Yihuang event, an extensively research on this case was conducted. 
Table 5 
Discussion of Yihuang event on Sina Weibo 
Topic Account  Time period Number of 
re-tweets 
Number of 
comments 
Two-way 
communication in 
comments 
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The Zhong 
family was 
harassed by 
the Yihuang 
officials 
during the 
night on Sep 
16, 2010 
Deng Fei 09/17/2010, 
09:34 – 
09/23/2010, 
15:51 
352 189 4 
Zhong Rujiu 09/17/2014, 
11:48 – 
10/02/2010, 
14:11 
292 313 18 
 
The Role of Sina Weibo in Yihuang Event 
To understand Yihuang event better, it is helpful to know some background of the 
urbanization and the economic development in China. In recent years, China has developed 
fast. However, this economic growth is mainly based on real estate development and export. 
These activities, especially the real estate development, contribute to the conflicts between 
the Chinese government and the Chinese citizens. This is because the Chinese government 
needs to recover the lands where the residents live, and then sell it to developers or build 
public facilities. Further, the government and the residents might never reach agreements on 
the relocation compensation since each party wants to maximize its own interest. Therefore, 
the Chinese government and the Chinese citizens separate: the Chinese government 
represents the so-called “collective interest” or the party elite interest; the Chinese citizens 
defend the individual interest or the grass-roots interest. The conflicts between the two parties 
usually happed in county-level in China. 
Table 6 
Administrative divisions of China 
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Level Name Types 
1 Provincial 
level  
省级 
Municipality 
直辖市 (4) 
Province 
省 (23) 
Autonomous 
region 自治区 
(5) 
Special administrative 
region 特别行政区 
(2) 
2 Prefectural 
level 
(excluding 
Taiwan) 
地级 
Prefectural-l
evel city  
地级市 
(283) 
Prefecture 
地区 （17） 
Autonomous 
prefecture 
自治州 （30） 
Leagues  
盟 （3） 
3 County 
level 
(excluding 
Taiwan) 
县级 
Distric
t 
市辖
区 
（853
） 
 
Count
y-level 
city 
县级
市
（370
） 
Count
y 
县 
（146
1） 
Auton
omous 
county 
自治
县 
（117
） 
Banne
r 
旗 
（49） 
Auton
omous 
banner 
自治
旗 
（3） 
Specia
l 
district 
特区 
（2） 
Forestr
y 
district 
林区 
（1） 
4 Below the 
county 
level 
(excluding 
Taiwan) 
县以下 
Town 
镇  
（19410） 
Township 
乡  
（14571） 
Sub-district office 
街道办事处  
（6923） 
Agency 
区公所  
（2） 
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As table 1 shows, counties belongs to the third level of administrative divisions in 
China, and geographically they are at the border areas between urban and rural. 
Economically, the main source of county revenue is agriculture. Most county residents are 
agricultural Hukou (a resident registration system in China. Chinese citizens are categorized 
into those hold non-agricultural Hukou and those hold agricultural Hukou). Also, county 
governments are particularly important in China since counties are the lowest layer at which 
the Chinese central government really function. Hence, counties have always been at the 
forefront of urbanization in China, and county governments need to promote the process. 
Then, county residents and county governments might conflict. The Yihuang event happened 
in this context.  
 
Figure 8. Map of divisions in China. From 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:China_County-level.png 
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Yihuang is a small county that belongs to Fuzhou city (prefectural-level city) in 
Jiangxi province that is in the southeast of China. Before 2000 this county didn’t have transit 
road, state road, highway, railway, water transport, and air transport, so it was very 
impoverished. In this context, economic development is the most important priority to the 
Yihuang government. In 2007, they decided to build a new bus terminal in the east where the 
Zhong family’s house located. However, the Zhong family and the Yihuang government 
could not reach an agreement about the relocation compensation. Hence, the Zhong family 
refused to move out, and this was the fuse of the next tragedies.  
On September ten 2010, the Yihuang county head led more than one hundred officers 
to the Zhong family and tried to demolish their house. During this process, the officers 
quarreled with the Zhong family, and they caught several Zhong family members. Fearing to 
lose their house, Zhong Ruqin, Luo Zhifeng, and Ye Zhongcheng used gasoline to commit 
self-immolation to fight against the Yihuang officers. This emergency stopped the planned 
forced demolition.  
Two days later, the Yihuang government released an official interpretation that 
explained this event as an accidental injury. Also, the officers claimed that the Zhong family 
played the old trick of spilling gasoline to intimidate the officers but inadvertently burned 
themselves. The Zhong family denied this explanation, and they insisted that the three Zhong 
members ignited themselves to protest against the forced demolition. To reflect the truth to 
the central government and protect their rights and interests, Zhong Rujiu and Zhong Rucui, 
daughters of the Zhong family, decided to fly to Beijing to on September 16 to petition. This 
day was considered to be the watershed of the Yihuang Event. On that day the Zhong sisters 
Bi 37 
 
went to the Nanchang airport and planned to take the airplane at 8:15 AM to Beijing to reflect 
the situation and accept the interview of Hong Kong Phoenix Television. However, when 
they were exchanging boarding tickets, forty-four Yihuang government officials blocked 
them and caught Zhong Rujiu. At this moment, Zhong Rucui asked help from the airport 
staff. One staff took them to the passenger seating area and notified the airport police. Several 
minutes later, the Yihuang leaders and the airport police came, and they took the Zhong 
sisters to the airport public security bureau office where the Zhong sisters called Liu Chang 
who is a journalist of New Century Weekly and told him this circumstance. Liu Chang tried 
to call the airport public police but no one replied. Without other ways to seek assistances, he 
posted the first microblog about this airport event on Sina Weibo and asked help from the 
Internet users at 7:39 AM since the Chinese people usually check messages on their mobile 
phones. At first, only a few microbloggers re-posted it. However, twenty minutes later the 
situation changed because the Sina Weibo opinion leader Murong Xuechun forwarded it. 
Within one hour, this post had been re-posted nearly one thousand times, and in that morning 
it had been forwarded more than two thousand times and received more than one thousand 
comments. At 7:50 AM, half an hour before their plane was to take off, Zhong Rucui asked 
the airport police to help them board, but they were refused and were told that the higher 
authorities forbade them to do so. 
 The airport police then suggested the Zhong sisters to leave the airport and talk with 
the Yihuang officers in another place. The sisters obeyed and the Yihuang officers followed 
them as they left the bureau office. The Zhong sisters went to the ladies room, they rushing in 
and locking themselves in the corner compartment. It was their last refuge. Terribly, every 
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several minutes, a Yihuang female officer knocked at their door and requested them to come 
out to talk. In this corner, they called a staff of the Phoenix Television Liu Chang and 
described the situation to Liu. Liu typed it into computer and sent it to Deng Fei, a journalist 
of the Phoenix Television via QQ (an instant message service). At 8:57 AM Deng posted the 
first microblog on Sina Weibo to report that the Zhong sisters were blocked by the Yihuang 
officers. At 9:04 AM he sent the second post to report the ladies room event. In the next three 
hours, Deng posted more than twenty microblogs and nine were reported live under the 
name: “The Battle of the Ladies Room” (女厕攻防战). These posts attracted many 
microbloggers and journalists. Hearing this event, Zhang Guodong, a journalist from 
Southern Metropolis Daily, rushed to the airport. At the same time, the Kuliu Website, a 
famous Chinese video site similar to YouTube, contacted the Zhong sisters and interviewed 
them through mobile phone in the ladies room. Two hours later, this record was uploaded 
onto the Internet. Because of these reports and the instant messages on Sina Weibo, tens of 
thousands of netizens became concerned about this event and re-posted these texts 
everywhere. In addition, the Tencent website put the ladies room battle at the front-page of 
their Weibo. At 10:00 AM, Zhang Guodong arrived at the airport and helped the Zhong 
sisters out of the ladies room that the two Yihuang female officers were still guarding. The 
Yihuang county mayor took the Zhong sisters to a teahouse to talk. Finally, they reached an 
agreement: the next morning, in the presence of the media, the Zhong sisters would talk with 
a higher officer of Fuzhou city (the higher officer can directly deal with what happened in 
lower level divisions according to the Chinese law). 
At noon of the same day, Deng received a phone call from a Sina staff notifying him 
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that due to too much pressure they planned to delete all his posts about the battle of the ladies 
room. However, they did not clearly explain the source of this pressure, but it was assumed to 
be the government. Although it was disappointing, all his messages were forwarded to other 
famous websites such as Tianya and Mop, so netizens still could obtain this information. Also, 
this event had already attracted tens of thousands of Internet users and many journalists. Thus, 
at this moment, the Zhong sisters would be safe. That same night the Chengdu TV station 
from Sichuan province and Hong Kong Phoenix Televison broadcasted the programs about 
this airport event. Because of microblogging, the Yihuang local event became a breaking 
news. However, no local newspapers or TV stations in Jiangxi province and Yihuang county 
reported this event. In China this phenomenon is normal that the local media either not report 
the scandals or report it in a positive way due to pressure from the government.  
In the morning of September 17, experiencing the huge power of microblogging, 
Zhong Rujiu opened her Sina and Tencent Weibo accounts. Her accounts immediately 
attracted more than ten thousands of microbloggers. The same night, the Fuzhou municipal 
party committee, the superiors of the Yihuang officers, released a statement saying they had 
decided to “deal with” eight high level Yihuang officials that were responsible for the 
self-immolation and the battle of the ladies room events without clarifying the charges. The 
Yihuang county party secretary Qiu Jianguo and the Yihuang county mayor Su Jianguo 
would be investigated. However, the next day Zhong Rujiu reported on Sina Weibo and 
Tencent Weibo that her ancle Ye Zhongcheng, the victim in the self-immolation event, was 
dead. Even worse, the Yihuang county party secretary Qiu Jianguo led more than one 
hundred people grabbed the corpse to stop the hospital to issue death certificate without 
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which the Zhong family could not prove that Ye was dead. She also stated on her Weibo that 
her brothers, sisters and she were under house arrest by the Yihuang officers. At the same 
night, the turning point occurred; the Fuzhou city mayor came to the hotel where the Zhong 
family was house arrested and promised that they would be free and that the government 
would send the best doctors to cure the remaining two victims of the self-immolation event. 
From this moment, the situation began moving in the right direction.  
In the following days, Zhong Rujiu continued to send messages and photos of these 
events on Weibo, refuted the Yihuang official explanation, and revealed the true process of 
the whole event. She also received help from other microbloggers to assist her to arrange the 
best surgeons to treat her family members. The online support further transformed into offline 
actions.  
Finally, on October 10 the Jiangxi provincial party committee decided to remove Qiu 
Jianguo from the position of Yihuang county party secretary and dismiss Su Jianguo from the 
position of Yihuang county mayor. Although they did not provide official interpretation or 
mention the Yihuang event, this is the first event among the nine similar forced demolition 
cases in recent years in which the officers in command were punished. In “The Tragedy of 
Self-immolation on Weibo Live,” Law and life, the influential central-level legal news 
publication, commented that the Yihuang event reflected the power of microblogging to 
protect the citizens’ rights and interests. Without microblogging, the journalists could not 
have reported these events immediately, no one would have known the tragedy of the Zhong 
family, the Zhong sisters would have been caught and brought back to Yihuang, and the 
ending would have been lamentable such as what happened before microblogging. In the 
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previous nine events the texts of these cases were deleted, no new posts of such issues were 
allowed, and no one knew what happened to the victims. Weibo provides a place for the grass 
roots to report news and express their opinions, while avoiding the information censorship 
and control in China. With Weibo, every citizen can be a journalist and provide information 
to the public. This has been changing the way people get information and the communication 
between the government, media, and individuals. Figure 9 reveals the influence of 
microblogging: every Internet user can report news to the public and interact with mass 
media and the Chinese government; this communication might affect the opinion of mass 
media and the decision-making of the governments (Liu). 
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Figure 9. The changes of microblogging brought to the public opinion generated 
mode. Adapted from “The Impact of Microblogging to the Public Opinion Generated Mode,” 
people.com. 
As figure 9 illustrates, in the Yihuan event microblogging reflected its power to the 
government and mass media. Before the self-report of Zhong Rujiu and other texts on Sina 
Weibo, the Yihuang government reported the self-immolation event as an accident. In the 
report, the Yihuang government did not take any responsibility to this tragedy and shifted the 
blame to the victims. On the official perspective, the Zhong family obstructed the economic 
development and the collective interest of Yihuang. However, several days later this text was 
cancelled since the Yihuang official explanation obviously contradicted to the information on 
Weibo. Similar to the government’s behavior, the state-run news media People’s Daily also 
changed their attitudes after the Yihuang event was exposed on Weibo. On September 14, 
People’s Daily stated that claiming rights should not always rely on self-injury and asks 
citizens to find other ways such as independent third-party arbitration institutions to protect 
their interests (Zhang). In this article, the author does not mention the reasons, the process, 
and even the government action in the Yihuang event. Also, the writer displays no sympathy 
to the victims and defines this event as self-injury. It is clear that the state-run media 
represents the interests of the Chinese government and the party elite. The individual interest 
of the Chinese citizens may be not the issue they want to discuss. However, just a few days 
after the battle of the ladies room microblogging live, People’s Daily changed their position. 
On September 20, they released another report about the Yihuang event. They claimed that 
the Chinese central government had forbidden the local government to execute demolition 
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directly a few months ago. Also, they emphasized that the local governments should consider 
the individual interests during the economic development and should not regard ordinary 
citizens as opponents (Fan). Within the short span of six days, the People’s daily dramatically 
transformed from the watchdog of the party elite to the defender of the grass roots. Except the 
direction from the highest authorities, it is highly possible that the information on Sina Weibo 
forced the government and the official media to change.  
Technically, if someone is not satisfied with the compensatory decisions of 
demolition, she or he could seek for legal activities to protect their rights. The solutions are: 
applying for administrative reconsideration, filing an administrative lawsuit, and petitioning. 
In this case, the Zhong sisters tried to fly to Beijing to petition. Petitioning is know as 
complaint letters and visits (信访) in China, and the meaning in China is not identical with 
the English interpretation. According to Regulation on Complaint Letters and Visits (信访条
例), the term complaint letters and visits means “the activities that a citizen, legal person or 
any other organizations who, by way of letter, e-mail, telephone or visit, etc., reports facts, 
submits proposals or opinions, or files a complaint to the people’s governments at various 
levels or working departments of the people’s governments at or above the county level, 
which shall be dealt with by the relevant administrative organs according to law”. The Zhong 
sisters’ behavior belongs to the category of visit. However, they failed, and the Yihuang 
officials brought them back. Usually, if the complaint makers failed to petition, the local 
governments might punish them (Fang, 2013), although such punishments are prohibited by 
law. For instance, a report issued by Human Rights Watch (2005) says Ms. Kang, a rural 
woman went to Beijing to petition for her injured husband, but the retrievers (截访人员) 
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seized her and brought her back to Jilin: 
[In Jilin], I spent sixteen days in the detention house. They shackled me to a chair                         
by my hands and feet. I couldn’t move at all. Everything was swollen, my hands, 
my feet. Everything became numb. They beat me and I couldn’t take it. It was so 
hard. After sixteen days, I was sentenced to reeducation through labor for one year. 
It was the first month of the lunar new year [roughly, February 2002]… 
I was beaten in there four times because I wouldn’t eat. I’m a vegetarian so I don’t 
eat meat… (p. 52) 
Similar cases are not uncommon in China. Hence, without Sina Weibo it is highly 
possible that the Yihuang government would have demolished their house and sent them to 
prison with no charges. Sina Weibo did help them prevent the potential tragedies and protect 
their rights and interests. In addition, the re-tweet by opinion leaders helped the information 
to spread. 
How about if the Zhong sisters successfully go to Beijing? Technically, the Zhong 
sisters should make the complaint to Yihuang county government or the next higher-level 
government – Fuzhou city government based on the Regulation on Complaint Letters and 
Visits. Even they went to the Chinese central government to petition, the central government 
would order the local government to resolve it. Usually, not only the local official do not 
handle the case justly, but also punish or torture the petitioners. Mr. Ming, a former school 
teacher in Shanxi, came to Beijing to make a complaint in 2004. The reason is that his family 
members were beaten by a group of thugs and one was died, but after he called the police 
they didn’t take it seriously. Even worse, he tried all possible means for two years, the city 
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police, the city government, the county police, yet no one cared. Although he received letters 
from national authorities and instruct the local government to deal it, no local officials took it 
seriously. They even said, “We’ll drag it out till you’re dead [wo men tuo si ni]. Once you die, 
the problem is solved” (Human Rights Watch, 2005, p. 84). Thus, even the Zhong sisters 
went to Beijing successfully and got reply from the central government, the Yihuang 
government might not resolve the problem.  
In short, the ordinary Chinese people hardly seek justice via the petitioning system. 
No matter where they go, their attempts are useless. How about administrative 
reconsideration and lawsuit? In a country one party controls, and the leaders in governments 
or administrative departments have absolute power. The leaders such as county mayors can 
easily influence the decisions made by judicial court or people’s congress, and judicial 
independence cannot exist. Hence, without Sina Weibo and forwarding by the opinion leaders 
the Zhong family members are dead. 
The function of Sina Weibo in the Yihuang event 
      In the Yihuang event, Weibo helped the users to report real-time news, seek help, 
express opinions, supervise governments, and even influence government decisions.  
       First, Weibo helped the grass roots publish breaking news and broadcast the truth to 
the public that was impossible before. On September 18 2010, more than thirteen thousand 
microbloggers re-posted and commented Zhong Rujiu’s messages, photos, and videos about 
the Yihuang event on Tencent Weibo (all the information about this event on Sina Weibo was 
deleted completely). Not only the Internet users forwarded these messages on Weibo, but also 
they re-posted it on famous websites and forums such as Tianya and Mop. Moreover, when 
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they forwarded these texts, they asked others to re-post and help the Zhong family. For 
instance, one microblogger says: “re-posting, make more people know it.” Also, another 
re-poster states: “forwarding is help, crowd is power.” These actions attracted more Chinese 
to concern this event and made the government know that the ordinary citizens had already 
known the truth, so they could not hide the reality anymore. Before the emergence of 
microblogging, the victims of the events in which the government violated the citizens’ rights 
and interests had no way to tell the truth to the public. Even if some media tried to report the 
events, these newspapers or magazines would be forbidden to publish by the government. 
The information online would have been deleted entirely before lots of people could know it. 
However, with the help of Weibo and its combination with mobile phones, the victims can 
send messages on Weibo and broadcast them to one billion cell phone users in China. Even 
some people do not have Weibo accounts, they can get this information through other ways 
by mobile phones such as surfing the websites or receiving SMS from their friends. Hence, 
once a piece of news is broadcasting on Weibo, no way can stop the spread completely unless 
the government shuts down the whole Internet service and the telecommunication service, 
which is nearly impossible. In the Yihuang event, Weibo helped the Zhong family to update 
their situation and ask for help from other microbloggers. Eepecially in the battle of the ladies 
room event, microblogging and the mobile phone are the only ways to communicate and 
report the scene, and they finally helped the Zhong sisters avoid constraining by the Yihuang 
government. Therefore, the convenience of posting texts and sharing them with the enormous 
mobile phone users equips the grass roots the ability to send sensitive information and be 
individual journalist to tell the truth.  
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Further, the real-time of microblogging makes it possible for the victims to get help 
immediately from other microbloggers. Since nearly everyone in China owns a mobile phone, 
the eyewitness can instantly send the photos and reports on Weibo. In the battle of the ladies 
room event, the journalists promptly reported it to the microbloggers and attracted lots of 
attentions. Without it, people might still know the event, but they could not help the Zhong 
sisters because the sisters would have been brought back to Yihuang and persecuted by the 
government before others knew it. Also, the Zhong sister asked other microbloggers to find 
excellent surgeons to cure the victims in the self-immolation tragedy, and several users from 
different cities assisted her to arrange the best burn therapist from the Chinese PLA General 
Hospital in Beijing to fly to Nanchang to treat the patients when the Nanchang hospital had 
no way to cure them. In such disasters, microblogging can broadcast it instantly, seek help 
even fast than the government and institutions, and avoid the situation becoming worse which 
is impossible before the emergence of Weibo. Hence, microblogging helps the victims get 
assistance promptly and prevent the government from further hurting the vulnerable 
individuals.  
Also, the anonymity of Weibo makes the grass roots can express their opinions freely, 
e.g. send massages against the government, and this make the government in high tension. 
For example, on September 18 2010, one microblogger commented on Zhong Rujiu’s 
Tencent Weibo message and said: “history has proved that who abandon people will finally 
be discarded by people.” Another user even stated: “please forwarding: if the government 
compels its citizens too much, people will overthrow it.” Many similar posts were updated 
and these texts were forwarded widely. This clearly displayed that the grass roots were not 
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satisfied with the Chinese government, and they even wanted to revolt. These political 
sensitive texts on Weibo might attract the attention of the central government because 
maintaining the social stability is the most important policies to them, and they fear rebellions 
happen in China. Thus, it is possible that the central government would force the local 
government to compromise to the victims to avoid such anti-government sentiment further 
developing. In the Yihuang event, the higher authorities probably had applied this strategy to 
put pressure on the Fuzhou and Yihuang government, and forced them to stop the forced 
demolition and treat the Zhong victims. 
 On Weibo not only some mircobloggers addresses these anti-government ideas, but 
also they construct a new identify of Chinese netizens that distinguishes from what identity 
the Communist Party of China and the Chinese government try to establish for the Chinese 
citizens. On September 18 2010 a microblogger claimed: “the government and the citizens 
are always opponents.” Another poster stated: “China is not belong to ‘them,’ China is ours.” 
A netizen even queried: “which interest does the government represent?” Also, a 
microblogger argued: “what the Zhong family could rely on is only the netizens.” These posts 
reveals that many Internet users consider that the party and the grass roots are separating and 
they believe the idea of netizen is a new identity of the grass roots. Microblogging would 
help them to protect their rights and interests from being violated by the government. In 
addition, many microbloggers applied the idea of netizen to call other users to take action to 
help the Zhong family and be united. These behaviors attracted lots of Internet users to 
behave as a netizen and react to the Yihuang event. The unity of the Chinese netizens might 
further stir the Chinese society to change.  
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While in the Yihuang event the Zhong family protected their rights and interests, this 
was not a complete victory of applying microblogging to fight against the government, and 
the power of Sina Weibo did not change the opinion of the government essentially. For 
instance, at September 17 night, the Fuzhou municipal party committee decided to deal with 
the Yihuang officers. However, on September 20, the Fuzhou government sent a report to 
Xinhua news agency that is one of the most influential state-run news media that represents 
the government’s views. In this report they insisted that the forced demolition was legal and 
no illegal activities happened in the whole process. In additon, they accused the Zhong family 
of requiring excessive relocation compensation. This was in stark contrast to the former 
official decision. If the forced demolition action was justifiable, the Yihuang officers should 
not have been investigated. From the contradiction between these two official actions, while 
it is highly possible that microblogging had pushed the government to react to the Yihuang 
event and cure the Zhong victims, it did not change their opinions fundamentally. 
In addition, On Weibo the Zhong family asked the higher authorities to help them and 
this was supported by many microbloggers. Also, during the decision-making process of 
punishing the Yihuang higher-level officers no judiciary participated and all results were 
release by the government without clarifying the charges. This is similar to what happened 
before the advent of microblogging: when their interests were violated by the local 
governments, the grass-roots always went to Beijing to petition for a fair judge from the 
central government. In the Yihuang event at first the Zhong sisters did want to do the same 
thing, but finally asked help on Sina Weibo because they were obstructed by the Yihuang 
government. They wanted the microbloggers to help but also appealed to the assistance from 
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the higher authorities. While microblogging provides another way for the grass-roots to seek 
assistances and express ideas, the victims still need the attention of the government though 
they could receive help from other netizens to some extent. Therefore, the revolution with the 
help of online social media (the “digital democracy”) to overthrow the government such as 
the Arab Spring might not happen in China since the Chinese government maintains the 
authoritarian style of rule and many Chinese citizens still believe the central government and 
expect them to protect the individual rights and interests. Thus, the central government’s 
reaction to online social media is fundamental to the future development of new media in 
China.  
What is the current central Chinese government’s attitude towards Weibo? The 
absence of the central government’s Weibo accounts reveals that they are reluctant to adapt to 
the social media and use it to actively communicate with the ordinary people. Two reasons 
might explain the government’s tardiness: the central Chinese leadership does not want to 
participate (e.g., they do not really care the potential of Weibo); they do not know how to 
apply the online social media and are studying it now. If the former is true, then the Chinese 
citizens might need to keep pushing the government to talk with them. However, if the latter 
is true, what is going to happen? Will the Chinese government communicate with the 
netizens online and try to resolve problems? Will the digital democracy come to China? The 
situation in Israel might help to answer.  
During the 2008-2009 Gaza War, the Israeli government limited reporters to 
approaching the war zone, yet they recruited many volunteers to open a PR campaign to gain 
international support via using online social media. Besides, the Israeli Defense Forces 
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launched a YouTube Channel and uploaded several videos with English subtitles to justify 
their attack. Although some viewers question IDF’s justification, the clips became very 
popular (Kuntsman & Stein, 2010). Not only the IDF proactively applied online social media, 
but also they restricted their soldiers to carry cell phones and interfered with electronic signal 
in the Strip. As a result, the Palestinian fighters’ communication was interrupted and ordinary 
Gazans’ reporting was neither blocked. Although hard to measure, it is possible that these 
state-sponsored operations positively influenced some people’s perception of Israel. However, 
in late May 2010 in the reporting of the Gaza flotilla raid in cyberspace, the Israeli state’s 
efforts seemed not as effective as in the Gaza War. Both the flotilla and the Israeli state used 
social media to update news and post visual materials, yet the reliability and credibility of the 
documents were questioned and the same visual information generated divergent readings on 
the Internet. Also, many people off the battlefield had participated in supporting or opposing 
the Israeli occupation in social media. Such phenomenon on the one hand demonstrated the 
political potential of online social media to let everyone’s voice be heard, one the other hand 
showed the paradox of new media: reveal and conceal the truth at the same time.  
If the Chinese government begins to engage in online social media, will it operate as 
the Israeli government? In these events, the Israeli state tried to control the information flow 
and manipulate people’s conception of the government. However, many viewers and activists 
posted different photos and texts to oppose the government’s documents, and eventually the 
truth was not covered from the public. Will the power of new media take effect in China if 
the Chinese government tries to apply online social media as the Israeli government? 
Unfortunately, it is possible that the Chinese leadership could control online information 
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more “effectively” than the Israeli government. The reason is that the channels they use are 
fundamentally different: the Israeli state has been applying the “Western” social media such 
as YouTube, while the Chinese government would use the domestic social media such as 
Weibo. In China, nearly all the Western social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube) 
is blocked, and the Chinese residents only could use domestic social media (e.g., Weibo or 
Renren). Hence, the Chinese government could control the information more easily than the 
Israeli government. For example, they could require the Sina company to cancel all sensitive 
messages on Weibo, and this kind of actions have been taken several times by the Chinese 
government. In contrast, the Israeli government could not control the information on the 
Western social media, and netizens could oppose the Israeli government through posting their 
own photos and messages. Therefore, the capability of controlling information flow of the 
Chinese central government is far beyond the Israeli government, and the power of the online 
social media to expose the truth would be limited in China. 
Moreover, most information on Chinese social media is written in the Chinese 
language, while many messages about Israel in online social media is posted in the English 
language. The use of different languages could make huge different reactions among online 
users. The Chinese language is nearly impossible to be understood by westerners, while the 
English language could be understand by netizens from many different countries. Hence, the 
Israeli government needs to be more cautious and sometimes even compromise to the 
pressure of public opinion. In contrast, the Chinese government would not be bothered by the 
Western viewers, so they could ignore the Chinese citizens’ opinions to some extent or even 
completely cancel the negative news about the government online.  
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Besides, the target audience of the Israeli government is the westerners, yet the 
Chinese government’s audience should be the Chinese people if they choose to use online 
social media. In addition, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an international issue and has 
drawn much attention from the Western countries, so the Israeli government is under 
enormous pressure. However, the issues on Sina Weibo usually are China’s domestic events 
even though they are also related to human rights, and not as many Western people might be 
interested in these issues as in the Israel-related events. As a result, the Chinese government 
could treat the Chinese netizens and the domestic issues totally based on their interests.  
In reality, the Chinese government already implemented censorship on Sina Weibo, 
but before an event happens they do not know what to cancel. Thus this is not as effective as 
they hope and the information spreading on Sina Weibo is out of technical control (Murong, 
2013). Also, they began to arrest opinion leaders on Sina Weibo. For instance, Xue Manzi 
was arrested in Beijing for prostitution, and this was reported by Chinese Central Television. 
One might argue that Sina Weibo exposed these opinion leaders and helped the Chinese 
government to locate and monitor the Chinese netizens. However, before the emergence of 
microblogging, the Chinese government had already arrested many democrats with no 
charges, and we even do not know who they are. With Sina Weibo, if opinion leaders are 
arrested, the microblogger would know and the Chinese government needs to give 
explanations. Hence, Sina Weibo does more harm than good to the absolute power of the 
Chinese government. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Recommendations 
As examined in the Yihuang event, Sina Weibo helped the Zhong family fight against 
the Chinese government, and without it they could not protest their rights and interests. Sina 
Weibo has been making the Chinese society more transparency. Even the Chinese 
government is under its pressure to explain government actions that the Chinese citizens 
would not know before. From this perspective, mobile social media do empower the ordinary 
people though Sina Weibo does not constitute a public sphere in China. The difference 
between China and the countries with access to global social media is that usually in China 
the Chinese residents apply Sina Weibo to defense rights, not protest. Thus, the potential of 
digital democracy has not been tested in China.  
After the arrestment of some opinion leaders, less people are talking about political 
issues on Sina Weibo, and this is similar to what happened on online forums before. However, 
the Chinese netizens can always find a new way to express their opinions. Recently, more 
and more people are shifting to WeChat (微信), a more private social media platform, to 
communicate with others. Although the censorship is implemented on this service, senders 
can easily bypass it via sending links to followers. As far as the people control the cutting 
edge technology, the social media will empower the Chinese citizens, and this is what is 
happening now. The only concern is that the judicial system is margined in the social media 
era just as what happened before the launch of Sina Weibo. Further study can be conducted to 
explore how mobile social media works with the Chinese law. Without respects to the 
judicial system, civil society is nothing but dream in China. 
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Appendix 
Coding manual  
Type of comment 
1. information 
2. emoji 
3. no information  
Validity of comment 
1 if yes (type 1) 
0 if no (type 2 and 3) 
Category of valid comment 
1 if political 
0 if apolitical 
n/a if invalid 
Attitude in political comment (towards the Chinese government and officials) 
1 if positive 
0 if neutral 
-1 if negative 
n/a if invalid or apolitical 
Content of negative political comment 
1. Criticism with no mobilization 
2. Mobilization 
n/a if invalid of apolitical 
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Coding schedule 
Comment 
number 
Type of 
comment 
Validity of 
comment 
Category of 
valid 
comment 
Attitude in 
political 
comment 
Content of 
negative 
political 
comment 
      
Completed Coding Schedule 
Comment 
number 
Type of 
comment 
Validity of 
comment 
Category of 
valid 
comment 
Attitude in 
political 
comment 
Content of 
negative 
political 
comment 
Z1 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z2 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z3 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z4 1 1 1 -1 2 
Z5 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z6 1 1 1 -1 2 
Z7 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z8 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z9 2 0 n/a n/a n/a 
Z10 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z11 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z12 1 1 1 0 n/a 
Z13 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z14 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z15 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z16 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z17 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z18 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z19 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z20 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z21 1 1 1 0 n/a 
Z22 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z23 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z24 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z25 1 1 1 0 n/a 
Z26 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z27 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z28 1 1 1 0 n/a 
Z29 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z30 1 1 1 0 n/a 
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Z31 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z32 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z33 1 1 1 0 n/a 
Z34 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z35 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z36 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z37 1 1 1 -1 2 
Z38 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z39 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z40 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z41 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z42 3 0 n/a n/a n/a 
Z43 1 1 1 0 n/a 
Z44 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z45 1 1 1 0 n/a 
Z46 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z47 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z48 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z49 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z50 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z51 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z52 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z53 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z54 3 0 n/a n/a n/a 
Z55 1 1 1 0 n/a 
Z56 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z57 1 1 1 0 n/a 
Z58 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z59 1 1 1 -1 3 
Z60 1 1 1 -1 3 
Z61 1 1 1 0 n/a 
Z62 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z63 1 1 1 0 n/a 
Z64 1 1 1 0 n/a 
Z65 1 1 1 -1 3 
Z66 1 1 1 -1 3 
Z67 1 1 1 0 n/a 
Z68 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z69 1 1 1 0 n/a 
Z70 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z71 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z72 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z73 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
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Z74 1 1 1 -1 2 
Z75 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z76 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z77 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z78 1 1 1 0 n/a 
Z79 1 1 1 -1 3 
Z80 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z81 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z82 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z83 1 1 1 0 n/a 
Z84 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z85 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z86 1 1 1 0 n/a 
Z87 1 1 1 0 n/a 
Z88 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z89 1 1 1 -1 2 
Z90 1 1 1 0 n/a 
Z91 1 1 1 -1 3 
Z92 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z93 1 1 1 0 n/a 
Z94 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z95 3 0 n/a n/a n/a 
Z96 1 1 1 0 n/a 
Z97 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z98 1 1 1 -1 3 
Z99 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z100 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z101 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z102 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z103 3 0 n/a n/a n/a 
Z104 1 1 1 -1 3 
Z105 1 1 n/a n/a n/a 
Z106 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z107 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z108 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z109 1 1 1 0 n/a 
Z110 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z111 1 1 1 -1 2 
Z112 1 1 1 -1 3 
Z113 2 0 n/a n/a n/a 
Z114 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z115 3 0 n/a n/a n/a 
Z116 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
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Z117 2 0 n/a n/a n/a 
Z118 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z119 1 1 1 -1 3 
Z120 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z121 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z122 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z123 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z124 1 1 1 -1 3 
Z125 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z126 1 1 1 -1 3 
Z127 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z128 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z129 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z130 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z131 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z132 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z133 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z134 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z135 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z136 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z137 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z138 1 1 1 -1 3 
Z139 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z140 1 1 1 -1 3 
Z141 1 1 1 -1 3 
Z142 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z143 1 1 1 -1 3 
Z144 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z145 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z146 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z147 1 1 1 0 2 
Z148 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z149 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z150 1 1 n/a n/a n/a 
Z151 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z152 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z153 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z154 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z155 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z156 3 0 n/a n/a n/a 
Z157 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z158 1 1 1 -1 3 
Z159 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Bi 65 
 
Z160 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z161 1 1 1 -1 3 
Z162 1 1 1 -1 3 
Z163 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z164 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z165 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z166 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z167 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z168 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z169 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z170 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z171 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z172 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z173 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z174 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z175 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z176 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z177 1 1 1 -1 3 
Z178 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z179 2 0 n/a n/a n/a 
Z180 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z181 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z182 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z183 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z184 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z185 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z186 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z187 1 1 1 -1 3 
Z188 1 1 1 -1 3 
Z189 1 1 1 -1 3 
Z190 2 0 n/a n/a n/a 
Z191 1 1 1 -1 3 
Z192 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z193 1 1 1 -1 3 
Z194 1 1 1 -1 3 
Z195 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z196 1 1 1 -1 2 
Z197 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z198 1 1 1 0 n/a 
Z199 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z200 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z201 1 1 1 -1 2 
Z202 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Bi 66 
 
Z203 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z204 1 1 1 -1 3 
Z205 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z206 1 1 1 -1 3 
Z207 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z208 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z209 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z210 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z211 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z212 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z213 1 1 1 -1 3 
Z214 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z215 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z216 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z217 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z218 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z219 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z220 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z221 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z222 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z223 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z224 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z225 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z226 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z227 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z228 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z229 2 0 n/a n/a n/a 
Z230 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z231 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z232 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z233 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z234 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z235 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z236 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z237 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z238 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z239 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z240 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z241 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z242 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z243 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z244 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z245 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Bi 67 
 
Z246 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z247 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z248 1 1 1 -1 3 
Z249 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z250 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z251 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z252 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z253 1 1 1 -1 1 
Z254 1 1 1 -1 3 
Z255 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z256 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z257 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z258 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z259 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z260 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z261 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z262 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z263 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z264 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z265 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z266 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z267 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z268 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z269 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z270 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z271 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z272 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z273 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z274 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z275 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z276 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z277 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z278 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z279 1 1 1 n/a n/a 
Z280 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z281 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z282 1 1 1 -1 3 
Z283 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z284 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z285 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Z286 1 1 0 n/a n/a 
Data Sources: http://weibo.com/1819775930/wr0nRpDWJP?mod=weibotime 
